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This thesis is concerned with the major factors that
account for the rise in personal bankruptcy rate in the
United States. These factors are the Reform Act of 1978,
Unemployment, Divorce Rate, Debt-Income Ratio, and Age.
An econometrics model was used in both a cross-
sectional and time series model to predict and see how much
these factors effect personal bankruptcy.
The objective of this thesis is to use an econometrics
model that helped explain successfully the cross-sectional
and time series variation in personal bankruptcy.
The results of the thesis found that the Reform Act
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Between 1959 and 1987, the number of personal
bankruptcy cases in the United States rose to more than
180,000 per annum. All evidence indicates that non-
business bankruptcy filing will continue to rise in 1988.
Financial failures had reached such proportions in 1984
that the federal courts were processing more than 200
personal bankruptcies per hour.1
During the twelve month period ending June 30, 1986,
568,942 Americans filed personal bankruptcy, an increase of
35.3 percent from 420,494 who filed during fiscal year
1985. Filing in 1986 surpassed the previous record of
449,839 cases filed in fiscal year of 1982 when a
prolonged recession and high interest rates severely
restrained the financial position of many American
households. Chart 1-1 shows the historical patterns of
personal bankruptcies since 1959.2
1Lawrence Shepard, "Accounting for the Rise in
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978," Journal of
Consumer Affairs (1984a), pp. 219-231.
2Charlie Carter, "The Surge in Bankruptcies: Is the
Law Responsible?" Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta (Winter 1982), pp. 20-30.
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Analysts generally agree that slow economic
growth, high interest rates, and distortion to consumer
budgets caused by unexpectedly rapid inflation during the
late 1970's forced many consumers into bankruptcy; yet a
large number of analysts are at least willing to consider
other factors must be at play. Advertising by the legal
community reduced stigma on those who filed bankruptcy;
greater awareness of consumer right; the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, are among other factors blamed for the rise in
personal bankruptcies.3
The level and distribution of costs (social and
private) associated with personal bankruptcy are enormous
and are of concern to policy makers. Those individuals who
consider themselves financial failures often coincide with
pronounced personal stress, marital discord, and loss of
home. Moreover, such debtors are generally stigmatized by
society and frequently encounter difficulty securing future
credit.
Aside from the consequences of personal bankruptcy
suffered by an individual, creditors also share in these
costs. Several billion dollars in financial obligations
3Ramona K. Hecks, "An Econometric Analysis of
Interstate Differences in Non-business Bankruptcy and
Chapter Thirteen Rates," Journal of Consumer Affairs. Vol.
15 (1981), pp. 13-31.
are forgiven by bankruptcy court each year, representing
a transfer of wealth from creditors to debtors.
In 1980, the bankruptcy court relieved consumers
of $12 billion in personal debt—about $14 for every man,
woman, and child in the United States.4 During that same
year, Sears reported an increase in loss of 109% while
Citibank reported an increase of 56% during that same
year.5
With personal bankruptcies on an enormous rise,
research on the subject of personal bankruptcy is needed to
help explain its fivefold increase during the past two
decades. Concern has been expressed over the burden of
consumer indebtedness on the economic stability of the
economy. The study of personal bankruptcy and causal
factors responsible for personal bankruptcy can possibly
enhance our understanding of the economic impact of credit.
Secondly, the rising bankruptcy rate possibly indicates
that a significant portion of our population has serious
financial problems, and it is important to learn more about
4Charlie Carter, "The Surge in Bankruptcies: Is the
Law Responsible?" Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta (Winter 1982), pp. 20-30.
5K. Kowaleki, "Personal Bankruptcy: Theory and
Evidence," Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland (Spring 1982), pp. 1-30.
the nature and extent of this problem and try to determine
solutions. Third, it is desirable to learn whether the new
law is operating efficiently, in the sense of meeting its
objective for which it was designed.
Objective of the Study
The purpose of this study is to provide a careful
analysis of factors that affects personal bankruptcy. We
do so by analyzing the importance of social, demographic
and economic characteristics underlying personal bankruptcy
over the period 1959-1987. Our ultimate objective is to
develop an econometrics model that would more successfully
explain time series and cross-sectional variation in
personal bankruptcies. The model is then to be used to
predict future trends in personal bankruptcies.
Specific objectives of this are:
1) To specify a testable model which incorporates the
information derived from earlier studies.
2) To use the model to predict future trends in
personal bankruptcies.
3) To test the accuracy of the model using a sample
of 300 personal bankruptcies in Atlanta during the year of
1985.
Order of Presentation
This thesis analyzes the determinant of aggregate
consumer bankruptcy rates in the United States during the
post-war period 1959-1987. Chapter II provides an overview
of federal and state bankruptcy codes. Chapter III
outlines previous research studies on consumer bankruptcy
in order to determine the set of factors viewed by others
as important in explaining the rise in personal bankruptcy.
The theoretical framework used to analyze social, economic
and demographic influence on consumer bankruptcy is
presented in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, the model is tested
using aggregate personal bankruptcy data for the period
1959-1987 and for a sample of 300 personal bankruptcy cases
in Atlanta. Empirical findings are summarized along policy
implications and suggestions regarding the future cause of
research into personal finance are all included in Chapter
V. The Appendices offer tables and relevant information
used in the study.
CHAPTER II
THE NEW BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
The Bankruptcy Reform Act was adopted by the United
States Congress in November of 1978. It was the first
major revision of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act in 40 years. The
Act was intended to modernize and make code uniform across
the nation. Before the new code came into effect, states
established their own dollar value of exemptions. Despite
the new federal law, states were still allowed to opt out
of the federal law by establishing their own exemptions.
Since 1978, about 37 states have opted out of the federal
exemption.
In discussing the code, this study reviews the type of
bankruptcies available to the consumer, discusses federal
exemptions, and finally discusses homestead and motor
vehicle exemptions in six southeastern states all of which
have opted out of the federal law.
Types of Bankruptcy Petition
There are currently two types of bankruptcy
petitions available to consumers; Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.
This thesis is only concerned with Chapter 7 and Chapter
13.
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Chapter 7 petition is complete liquidation of assets.
Here, all assets of the bankrupt's estate, except those
specifically exempted, are sold to pay the debt of the
bankrupt. A trustee is appointed to pay and distribute the
assets of the estate under 11 U.S.C. Section 702. The
trustee distributes the assets in the order of priorities
specified in the Bankruptcy Code until all assets of the
estate are exhausted, then discharged from further debts.
Any individual who resides or has a business in the United
States can file Chapter 7 provided the individual has not
filed a petition within 180 days that has been dismissed
voluntarily by the court.
Chapter 13 is a rehabilitation plan. Under this plan,
a trustee is appointed to distribute all or some portion of
the debtor's future income. The debtor is given the
exclusive right to file a payment plan. A discharge of
debt is granted after all payments have been completed, and
creditors have received no less than what they would have
received in a liquidation proceeding. Any individual who
resides or has a business in the United States and has a
regular source of income can file Chapter 13 provided
the individual has not filed bankruptcy that has been
dismissed voluntarily or by the court within 180 days of
filing. An individual's secured debt should not exceed
$100,000 and unsecured debt should not exceed $35,000.
The Federal Exemption Law
Exemption are the assets that cannot be liquidated
when a person files personal bankruptcy. It is designed to
help individual who file bankruptcy to make a "fresh
start." An individual who wants to file always considers
the exemptions available before deciding whether it would
be beneficial to file. Critics of the new code said the
new federal exemption law encourages people to file,
instead of looking for other ways of dealing with their
debt.
The federal exemptions are as follows:
1) $7,500 in homestead, real or personal property,
that the debtor or dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence or in a burial plot for the debtor or dependent.
This exemption only applies to the debtor's interest in the
property. An example of how it works is if a debtor has
jointly owned assets of $20,000 and $10,000 is left to be
paid in which his/her own interest is $5,000, the debtor's
interest is fully exempt. For a joint filing, the
homestead exemption is $15,000. This homestead exemption
property includes mobile homes, houseboats, and non-
ownership interest such as leases.
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2) $1,200 in value in one motor vehicle. If the car
is above the $1,200 amount, the debtor could use his unused
portion of another exemption.
3) $200 in value on any item, in household
furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals and musical instruments held primarily for
personal, family or a dependent of debtor like the others.
For a joint filing, the value is doubled to $400. In 1984,
Congress amended this law by giving the limit of $4,000 for
individual household goods and $8,000 for joint filing.
4) $500 jewelry held primarily for personal, family
or household use for debtor or the dependent. In this
exemption only $500 is allowed but if the jewelry is more
than $500, the debtor may use the unused portion of any
other exemption. This kind of exemption is called "wild
card exemption" because it would be a benefit to the
debtor's total exemption.
5) $400 amount of any property plus any unused amount
of homestead amount up to $3,750 per debtor. This was
usually $7,500 of homestead property but it was changed in
the 1984 amendment. This still gives tremendous
flexibility to both owners and renters. It could be used
for non-liquid property, causes of action, tax refund, cash
benefits, public benefits already received and other.
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6) $750 in value of any instrument, professional
books or tools of trade of the debtor or a dependent. This
exemption may overlap with other exemptions because they
may be used for things other than tools of trade. An
example is a car. This could be used as personal and as a
tool of trade.
7) Any unmatured life insurance contract owned by
debtor or dependent. Any insurance other than a credit
life insurance can be exempted. This is for the interest
of the debtor's life insurance which does not have cash
value. Any interest policy that does not have cash or loan
value could be included and it could be exempted in full.
Credit life insurance is excluded in a subsection and
if the debtor is a beneficial of this policy and the owner
is still alive, no exemption is to be made, since the
debtor has to have property interest in it. If the person
dies within 180 days of the debtor's filing for bankruptcy,
it can be used because it becomes the property of the
debtor's estate.
8) Professionally prescribed health aid for a debtor
or dependent. This covers wheelchair and artificial limbs.
It also includes specially equipped automobile and
automobile essentials to receiving medical treatment.
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9) Social Security benefits, unemployment compensation
or local public assistance benefits, veteran's disability,
illness and unemployment benefits are all exempt. These
exemptions are only for future benefits that are to come.
Past ones are not exempted.
10) Alimony support or separate maintenance to an
extent reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and
any dependent of the debtor are exempt. It is left to the
court to decide what amount of this exemption is a
reasonable amount of standard of living.
11) An award under crime victims reparation law. This
should not exceed $7,500 on account of body injury but not
include pain and suffering or pecuniary loss and of a
person who depends on the debtor.
12) A payment under a life insurance contract that
insured life of an individual of whom the debtor was a
dependent on the date upon such individual's death to the
extent reasonable for support of the debtor and dependent.
13) Retirement funds of Civil Service employee of the
United States and employee of the same executive
department.
14) Money payable under the foreign service retirement
and disability system.
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15) Benefits for death and disability of persons
covered by the Longshoreman Harbor Worker Compensation
Act.
16) Special pension paid to winners of the
Congressional medal of honor.
17) Benefits under any law administered by the United
States Veteran's Administration.
18) Money paid or payable or rights existing under the
Social Security Act.
19) Federal homestead land on debt contracted before
issuance of patent.
20) Annuities and pensions under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1936.
21) Railroad unemployment insurance benefit.
22) Wages of fishermen employed on fishing vessels,
seamen and apprentices.
23) Compensation for injury or death from war risk
hazards suffered outside the United States, contract
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The volume literature on the rise in personal
bankruptcy have increased since the Bankruptcy Reform Act
took effect on October 1, 1979. There is now considerable
literature focusing on why people file bankruptcy. Many
authors attribute the sharp rise in bankruptcies to the new
law, unemployment rate, divorce rate, recession, too much
use of credit, interest rate, age, race, shorter work week,
drop in income, debt-income ratio, and race.
Authors like Shiers and Williamson used a model of
risk reduction to analyze personal bankruptcy. The model
demonstrated how state and federal laws can affect the
quantity of resources that lenders devote to reduce loan
risk. They focus on how liberalized exemptions have
increased the number of people who filed.
The estimating model used was as follows:
TBKPCt = a0 + a1(UR - URt-1) + a2DURCb + a3PMINEt_3
+ a4GARNDt + a5OPUTDt + e
F. Shiers and Daniel P. Williamson, "Non-
business Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical Results,"





= Number of non-business bankruptcies filed per
1,000 population
UR = Unemployment rate
DVRC = Number of divorces per 1,000 population
PMINE = The fraction of personal income generated by
mining sector
GARND = A dummy variable measuring the
restrictiveness of a state's garnishment law
(=0 in states with no garnishment law and 1
otherwise)
OPOUTD = A dummy variable measuring the
restrictiveness of a state's exemption levels
e = error term
t = 1980, a time subscript
Cross-sectional data taken from 1980 was used in their
study.
Their expected result was that a low percentage of
personal income from the mining sector should bring a
reduced bankruptcy rate because the supply shock of energy
in the economy in 1979-1980. They expected to find a lower
personal bankruptcy rate in 1980 for those states where
mining accounts for a higher percentage of personal than
for those states where the mining sector accounts for
little or none of state income. They had no theoretical
expectation for wage garnishment to be theoretically
undetermined. States with high exemptions were expected to
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experience high personal bankruptcy rates. Unemployment
and divorce rates were expected to add to the per capita
bankruptcy rate.
They had three equations and three results. One on
total bankruptcy, the other two on Chapter 7 and Chapter
13. The results were as follows:
Total Bankruptcy:
TBKPC = 0.182(UR-URt_1) + 0.099DVRC + (-5.818)PMINE +
(3.192) (3.523) (3.150)
(-0.156)GRAND + 0.767OPOUTD + 381
(1.138) (4.933) (1.976)
R2 = .55, S.E.E. = 0.41.
Chapter 7:
BKPTC = O.lSefUR-UR^^ + 0.086DVRC + (-1.918) PMINE +
(3.455) (3.851) (1.988)
0.180GRAND + 0.431OPOUTD + 0.226
(1.646) (3.487) (1.474)
R2 = 0.51; S.E.E. = .33.
Chapter 13:
BKPC = O.OSSfUR-URt.-,) + 0.026DVRC + (-6.326) PMINE +
(1.333) (1.303) (4.754)
(0.032)GRAND + 5.067OPOUTD + 0.169
(0.328) (5.062) (1.219)
R2 = 0.44; S.E.E. = .30.
t statistics are in parentheses.
19
In the actual result wage garnishment was found to be
statistically insignificant. Unemployment and divorce rate
in Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 had their expected signs and
were statistically significant at the 99 percent level of
confidence but they were both insignificant to the rise in
personal bankruptcy rate. PMINE had a statistically
significant positive sign in all equations. Although the
wage garnishment levels was found to be insignificant, the
level of asset exemption was highly significant to all
three equations.
The asset exemptions1 dummy variable was also used to
change the slope parameter of the estimated equation.
OPOUT'd was then replaced with UROPOUTD (which is the change
in unemployment multiplied by the exemption dummy
variable). The results were as follows:
Total Bankruptcy;
BKPC = 0.142(UR-URt,) + 0.95DVRC + (-4.866)PMINE +
(2.289) + (3.228) (2.557)
(-0.158)GRAND + 0.382UROPOUTD + 0.463
(1.093) (4.268) (2.298)
R2 = 0.50; S.E.E. = 0.43.
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Chapter 7:
BKPC = 0.129(UR-URt_1) + 0.083DVRC + (-2.428)PMINE +
(2.725) (3.705) (1.672)
(-174)GRAND + (0.231)UROPOUTD + 0.276
(1.576) (3.376) (1.798)
R2 = 0.50; S.E.E. = .33.
Chapter 13:
BKPC = 0.024(UR-URt_1) + 0.023DVRC + (-5.715)PMINE +
(0.538) (1.091) (4.102)
(0.022)GRAND + 0.246UROPOUTD + (-0.106)
(0.204) (3.754) (0.715)
t statistics are in parentheses.
Increases in unemployment rate given, bankruptcy rates
were estimated to be higher in states with a low asset
exemption level. The regressions did not show that the
exemption level of the Bankruptcy Act caused an increase in
the rate. Instead, it showed that those states that had
high exemptions had high rates of personal bankruptcy and
those with low exemptions, low rates of personal
bankruptcy. Then they regressed the exemption dummy
variable against personal bankruptcy rates in 1978. The
maximum likelihood estimates with the asymptomatic t-
statistics were:
OPOUTD = -5.69 + 4.27 BKP78
(-3.47) (3.03)
LR = 15.61 (likelihood ratio = LR).
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The result then showed that there was a direct
relationship between bankruptcies and per capita
income in 1978. It predicts for states that have opted out
federal law have lower levels of bankruptcy rates. They
then concluded that bankruptcy rate is inversely related to
change in income that is not anticipated at the time of
loan. Asset exemption laws served as a substitute for the
resources lender in order to reduce the risk of default
loans.
The paper did not find that increase in the asset
exemptions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act caused personal
bankruptcy to increase.
Before the new law came into effect, Harris studied
causes of personal bankruptcy. In it, he argued that most
American households are insolvent and these people use
bankruptcy to relieve them from debt. He also argued that
insolvency of households is caused by an inadequate
provision for contractual commitments such as bank loans
and installment contracts or emergencies such as medical
bills.
Most households, Harris suggested, were not concerned
with the future. They continue to place their money in
less liquid assets such as durable goods instead of more
liquid assets like savings accounts. Durable goods are
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difficult to liquidate and therefore cannot help them when
they experience financial difficulty.2
The use of credit cards, national sales networks and
credit mechanisms, he said, may have forced households into
bankruptcy. The increasing number of filings is also
increasing costs for creditors and they pass those costs on
to the public in the form of higher interest rates. He
concluded by saying people with lack of knowledge of credit
and proper budgeting are those who file for bankruptcy and
to prevent this, people should utilize credit counseling.
Yeager used Harris1 idea of insolvency to develop his
model in which he tried to determine whether the problem of
personal bankruptcy constituted a threat to the aggregate
economic stability in the United States. He used two
models; the bankruptcy growth model and insolvency model.3
In his bankruptcy growth model, insolvency was
considered a prerequisite to bankruptcy; that was to say,
the number of consumers who commence bankruptcy proceedings
2Duane G. Harris, "Prosperity and Personal
Bankruptcy, •• Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland. (1971): 3-9.
3Frederick C. Yeager, "Personal Bankruptcy and
Economic Stability," Southern Economic Journal, vol. 141
(1974): 96-104.
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Bt = The number of consumer units who commence
bankruptcy in year t
It = The number of insolvent consumer units in year t
Some consumers who are insolvent do not file. Then the
previous equation can be written as,
Bt = c^tIt anc* 9 — 1
Bt and I are as defined above, and
q = Proportion of insolvent consumer units choosing
bankruptcy in year t.
For the economy as a whole, insolvency is measured as
It = f(Pt, Nt, 1^)
where:
It is as defined as above, and
Pt = Size of consumer population unit per year.
Nt = Number of consumer units in Pt in debt in year t.
Rt = Ratio of liabilities to assets for consumer units in
year t.
On a per capita basis:
Bt/pt " 9t[9(Nt' Rt)]
where Pt is population and all other variables are defined
earlier. Yeager used cross-sectional data covering the
period 1952-1963.
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In his study, the growth in bankruptcy was expected to
destabilize the economy. Younger people who are heads of
household are in great debt.
Yeager then found that more Americans tended to be in
the insolvent, especially younger households under the age
of 35. In 1962, 69% of younger households (25-34) had
liquid assets less their $500 in value. The percentage of
liquid assets to income declined between 1952 and 1962. He
also developed another model to observe the change in
insolvency.
Bt/Pt = Nta + REb
Bt, Pt, Nt and Rt are as defined above,
a = 0 < a < 1.
b = 1 - a.
d(B/P)t = q + CP
where C = change.
If Uq > 0, bankruptcy would rise. If Cq < 0,
bankruptcy would fall. Here he used the data between
1950-1970. He found that debt grew by 19 percent between
1950-1965 while income also rose. Yeager also estimated
the impact of debt burden with results as follows:
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P = 72.3 + 8.46D
(.494)
SpD = 7.2, R2 = .94, n - 20
P = Per capital incidence of bankruptcy.
D = Debt burden lagged six months.
Debt burden did not prove significant to bankruptcy rates.
Yeager's study concluded that personal bankruptcy
increases do not threaten the stability of the economy. He
also found that, despite the increase in personal
bankruptcy, creditors continue to consider consumers
trustworthy.
Shepard conducted two studies on the problem of
personal bankruptcy. The first was concerned with reasons
for the rise in personal bankruptcy. He analyzed the
determinants of aggregate consumer bankruptcy rates in the
United States in the post-war period.4
The estimated model used was
PB = bRCl + bUE + bCE + bNWP + bDR + bBC + C + E
where:
PB = Personal bankruptcy per 100,000.
RCI = Ratio of consumer installment and non-installment
credit to personal disposable income.
4Lawrence Shepard, "Accounting for the Rise in
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978," Journal of
Consumer Affairs (1984a): 219-231.
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CP = Per capita equity in residential real estate
(deflated).
UE = Unemployment rate lagged one year.
NWP = Non-white proportion of the population.
DR = Divorce rate.
BC = Bankruptcy reform code of 1978 (1945-1979) ;
otherwise
C = constant.
E = error term.
The study used time series data covering the periods
1945-1981. The time series trend influenced trends like
leverage, divorce rate, and unemployment. Also, it
influenced the new federal law and black deviant to
bankruptcy.
He estimated two regression equations, one on Chapter
13 and the other, Chapter 7. The results were as follows:
Chapter 7:
PB = 3.03RCI + 2.87UE! + (-0.57JCP + 31.45NWP + 13.57DR +
(3.78) (2.67) (-8.31) (5.94) (4.02)
20.30BC + (-238.7)
(1.98)
R = 0.97, DW = 1.61.
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Chapter 13:
PB = 1.32RCI + (-0.08)CP + 4.37DR + 32.37BC + (-1.72)
(11.25) (-4.73) (5.23) (17.75)
R = 0.93, DW = 1.98.
t statistic is reported in parentheses.
Shepard expected divorce rate to have a positive
effect on bankruptcies. Unemployment was expected to
affect only Chapter 7 filings. Per capita equity in
residential real estate was suppose to reduce bankruptcy
consumer installment debt. The non-white proportion of the
population was to have a positive effect. The new code was
also expected to positively affect both chapters.
As expected, the ratio of consumer installment and
non-installment debt to disposable income were positively
related to bankruptcy. A one percent change in debt income
ratio was associated with a rise of 3.03 bankruptcy and
1.32 Chapter 13 failure per 100,000 people. Chapter 7
specifications carried the correct sign and is
statistically significant only when there was a one year
lag in unemployment. It did not have any effect on Chapter
13.
The variable of residential wealth caused a drop in
personal bankruptcy. Divorce rate was more significant to
Chapter 7 than 13. The non-white proportion of the
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population was also significant in Chapter 7 but not in
Chapter 13. The new law was significant to higher rates of
bankruptcies.
He came to conclude that extensive use of credit is a
significant factor in explaining financial failure.
Divorce rate and proportion of non-white filing are
significant contributors to high bankruptcy rates.
In Shepard's second article, the impact of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act on the increase in personal
bankruptcy was studied.5 He used the same estimating model
as in his previous study except that government transfers
were added. The model was as follows:
PB = RCH1 + UR + CP + CGP + NWP + C + E
where:
PB = Personal bankruptcy per 100,000.
RCI = Ratio of consumer installment debt to personal
disposable income.
UR = Unemployment rate.
CP = Per capita equity in residential real estate
(deflated).
NWP = Non-white proportion of the population.
5Lawrence Shepard, "Personal Failures and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 with regards to Personal
Bankruptcy," Journal of Law and Economics (1984b): 419-437.
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CGP = Expected government transfer per capita (trailing
three years marginal data deflated).
E = error term.
Time series data was used covering the period of 1948-1983.
Shepard expected the unemployment rate to have
significant positive effect on Chapter 7 bankruptcies. The
consumer installment and non-installment credit to
disposable income variable were expected to have an
insignificant effect per capita in residential real estate
to have a negative effect. Government transfer was to have
a positive effect in increase in bankruptcy. Also, non-
white population was expected to have a positive effect on
bankruptcy.
The actual findings were as follows:
Chapter 7:
PB ■ 3.35RCI + 1.30UR + (-48)CP + 18.83NWP + 0.20CGP
(5.33) (1.41) (-6.54) (3.75) (2.78)
+ (-116.13)
R2 = .20; DW = 1.8.
Chapter 13:
PB = .44 + 0 + (-0.9) + 3.79 + 0.05 + 18.91
(2.99) (-5.65) (3.17) (2.95)
The results showed a positive effect of the
unemployment rate in Chapter 7, but no effect in Chapter
13. Non-white population showed a significant link to
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increase in the rate of the two chapters. Government
transfer had a positive sign and it was significant to the
increase in bankruptcies.
In conclusion, the Bankruptcy Reform Act was said to
have an effect on the bankruptcy rate. The effect of
rising in consumer wealth was offset by substantially
higher levels of government support, a dominant influence
in determining the rate. The debt discharged with this
doubling of bankruptcy rate was up to $1 billion for
Chapter 7 alone.
Carter's article dealt with whether increases in
bankruptcy rate in the United States and the Southeastern
states was caused by the Bankruptcy Reform Act.6
He examined trends in bankruptcy in the United States
and Southeastern states from 1959-1981. He noticed that
the snow-belt states had less bankruptcy growth than in the
Sunbelt states and that people are moving to the Sunbelt
states where there is high economic growth and this is why
the increase is more.
His main focus was on the effect of the law and the
effect of the recession on the increase in bankruptcy rate.
6Charlie Carter, "The Surge in Bankruptcies: Is the
Law Responsible?" Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta (Winter 1982): 20-30.
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This was done by subtracting the trends of bankruptcy and
the change in past economic downturns from the actual level
bankruptcy rate in 1980, and ascribed any additional
increase to the law. He estimated the influence of
increasing unemployment and decline in working conditions
on the rise in bankruptcies and then ascribed any residual
increase in bankruptcies to the influence of the federal
law and other factors that changed over time.
In the study, he estimated that the new code accounted
for two-thirds of personal bankruptcies in 1980. The
increase did not affect the Southeastern states as much as
the United States.
Hecks developed a stochastic model to account for the
observed variations in bankruptcy. The estimating model
was as follows7:
PB = AG + BPR + DR + MI + UR + TCO + CO + DI + CCO - LPW +
LLW + N + S + W
where:
PB = Personal bankruptcy per 100,000.
AG = Percentage population between 25-34.
BPR = Percentage of population which was black.
DR = Divorce rate.
7Ramona K. Hecks, "An Econometric Analysis of Interstate
Differences in Non-business Bankruptcy and Chapter Thirteen
Rates," Journal of Consumer Affairs, vol. 15 (1981): 13-31.
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MI = Percentage of manufacturing income.
UR = Unemployment rate.
TCO = Total credit to office per 100,000 population.
CO = Percentage of credit offices which were finance
companies.
DI = Debt income ratio per capita.
CCO = Existence of one or more consumer credit counseling
offices.
LPW = Existence of law prohibiting garnishment.




Hecks estimated two equations; one for Chapter 7 and
the other on Chapter 13. The expectation from these
equations were: Divorce rate was expected to be positively
related to Chapter 13 and 7. Unemployment was to be
positively related to Chapter 7 alone. Credit offices per
100,000 and finance companies were to be positively related
to personal bankruptcy. The ratio of consumer ratio debt
to income was suppose to be positively related to personal
bankruptcy.
A negative relationship among consumer credit
counseling office service and bankruptcy was expected.
Also, an inverse relationship between wage garnishment and
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bankruptcy was expected. For the variables pertaining to
states, there were no expected causative relations. The
estimated results were as follows:
Chapter 7:
PB = (-9.90)AG + (-.61)BPR + 14.01DR + 0.09MI + 2.29UR +
(-1.58) (-0.66) (2.62) (.10) (0.37)
(-I.IO)TCO + 1.84CO + 1.73DI + 12.03CCO +
(0.14) (2.44) (.48) (.88)
(-89.77)LLW + (-21.31)LLP + 91.90N + 72.95S + 94.75W
(-3.86) (-1.21) (.96) (.67) (1.84)
R2 = 0.864; Overall F = 22.62.
Chapter 13:
PB = 3.12AG + 1.01BPR + 9.55DR + 0.17MI + 5.58UR + 1.05TCO
(-0.58) (1.28) (2.88) (0.20) (1.04) (1.68)
+ (-.65)CO + 1.26DI + 18.39CCO + (-24.16)LLW +
(-1.00) (0.41) (1.57) (-1.21)
(-32.75)LLP + (-56.85)N + (-49.65)S + (-88.76)W
(-2.17) (-.65) (-.53) (-.89)
R2 = 0.305; Overall F = 2.43.
The result showed that the adjusted R2 was low in
Chapter 13. The divorce rate had positive sign, similar
effects, and was significant in the two equations. Age
also had significance to the bankruptcy rate event though
it had a negative sign. Credit offices which were finance
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companies had a positive effect on Chapter 7 and negative
sign in Chapter 13 and was insignificant.
The states that had prohibited wage garnishment had a
significant effect on Chapter 7 but not on Chapter 13.
This proved that insolvency causes households to utilize
Chapter 7.
State populations with lots of blacks had a
significant and positive relationship with Chapter 13. It
had a negative and insignificant relationship with Chapter
7. Total credit offices per 100,000 population and credit
counseling was positive and significant to both equations.
State laws which limited wage garnishment had a negative
significant effect only on Chapter 13.
In Heck's conclusion, he said that high divorce rates
and the percentage of a state's total credit office which
were finance companies are associated with higher non-
business straight-line bankruptcy. While higher
percentages of a state's population between the age of 25
and 34 and the existence of prohibiting wage garnishment
law suppressed non-business straight bankruptcy rates.
High percentage of black divorce rates and number of
credit offices per 100,000 population were associated with
Chapter 13. The law limiting wage garnishment was
associated with lower Chapter 13 rates.
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Finally, he said a high percentage of bankruptcy may
provide more credit sources to higher risk borrowers such
as low income individuals and many whom do not seek these
legal solutions to their financial problems.
The objectives of this literature survey enhance our
understanding of the personal bankruptcy. This thesis will
adopt the methodologies from existing literature to examine
specific factors responsible for cross-sectional variation
in personal bankruptcies. An important aspect of the
thesis is to develop an econometric model that would
predict a future rise in personal bankruptcy. This thesis
would provide an explanation to banks, policy-makers,
creditors, and other people involved in making decisions
about the cause about rise in personal bankruptcy.
CHAPTER IV
HYPOTHESIS, MODEL, OBJECTIVE AND DATA SOURCE
A. Hypothesis
The following hypotheses are suggested based upon a
review of the literature of personal bankruptcy.
Unemployment. Several studies used unemployment to
help explain personal bankruptcy. A change in the income
of a debtor affects the likelihood of personal bankruptcy.
Debt repayment and loss of employment results in unexpected
decline in money income, that is, a loss of income due to
unemployment causes an increase in the debt/income ratio.
The repayment of outstanding debt becomes more difficult
and burdensome as loan payments require a larger proportion
of income. In a situation where unemployment is prolonged
and other sources of income are limited, creditors will
threaten legal actions. The debtor is left with no choice
but to file personal bankruptcy.
In 1982, the national unemployment rate was 9.7
percent. During that same year the number of personal
bankruptcies was a record 449,839. Most states experienced
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filings again in 1986. Table 4-1 shows the unemployment
rates in the United States over the years 1959-1984.
Divorce rate. Divorce rate is the separation of a
family unit. This separation involves expenses such as the
legal costs of filing for divorce, one person having to
move out of the house, and the payment of alimony or child
support. This expense may lead to insolvency and
insolvency has been found to cause personal bankruptcy.
With this assumption, as the divorce rate in the nation
rises, we expect personal bankruptcy to rise.
Since the post-war period, the divorce rate has
increased. Table 4-2 shows the rise in divorce rate since
1959. A statistically significant and positive correlation
is expected between divorce rates and personal bankruptcy.
Debt-income ratio. Based on previous research,
household insolvency causes people to file for personal
bankruptcy. With extensive use of credit, people are now
spending more than they earn. This has forced more people
into debt in which they are not able to meet minimum
payments. These debtors would be left with no option but
to file for personal bankruptcy. The Yeager study found
that between 1950-1965, the debt-income ratio doubled but
stabilized at about 19% increase between 1966-1970. During
the latter period, the increase in personal bankruptcy rate
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was more stable at about 90 per 100,000 population. With
Yeager's finding, we decided to add the debt-income
variable to our set of explanatory variables.
We expect the debt-income ratio to be positive and
statistically significant related to personal bankruptcy.
Aae. Most people who file for personal bankruptcy are
said to be young. Yeager's study found that the average
solvent asset held by young people in 1962 was valued at
$500. We included the variable in our model to show the
effect of age on personal bankruptcy. The percentage of
people in the population between the age of 25-34 was used
because people in that age group tends to be more
insolvent. This is so because they have more bills to pay
and it is at this time of their lives they are trying to
establish households.
We expect a positive relationship between personal
bankruptcy and the percentage of the population between 25
and 34. We also expect age to be statistically significant
to personal bankruptcy.
Exemptions. Through exemptions, certain assets of the
debtor can be excluded from liquidation. Since this law
was passed in 1979, there has been a great deal of
criticism about this part of the law. Critics have said
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that the law is too generous and encourages more people to
file personal bankruptcy.
The variable entered the model as a dummy. In the
time series data, we used zero from 1959 to 1978 and from
1979-1983 one was used. This is to show the effect the
reform act has on personal bankruptcy filing. When the
exemption was used cross sectionally, one represented
states who had opted out of the federal homestead exemption
and had a lower homestead exemption than that of the
federal homestead exemption. Zero was used to represent
both the states that had a higher homestead exemption and
had opted out the federal exemption and those that still
used the federal exemption.
In both of the studies, we expect the exemptions to be
significantly related to personal bankruptcy and
statistically significant to personal bankruptcy.
B. Model
There were two estimating equations used in the study
of personal bankruptcy. One used for the time series data
and the other used for the cross-sectional data. Overall,
six variables were used—one dependent variable and five
independent variables. All variables were transformed to
natural logarithm except exemptions.
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Time Series Model
InPBRt = + Bj^LnUE + B2LnDR + B3U1DI + B4EL + e
where
PBR = Personal bankruptcy per 100,000
UE = Unemployment rate
DR = Divorce rate
DI = Debt-income ratio
GL = Exemptions 0 for 1959-78 and 1 otherwise
t = Error term
= Constant
Cross-Sectional Model
LogPBRt = + LogB0(UE - VEt_1) + LogB^^DR + LogB2Age
+ B3EL + e
where
PBR = State personal bankruptcy per 1,000
_UE = State unemployment rate
DR = State divorce rate per 1,000
Age = State population age (25-34)
EL = State exemptions
C. Objectives
The objectives of the study is to estimate the effect
of the above factors on personal bankruptcy rate in the
U. S. over the period 1959-1987. We assume a non-linear
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3) Debt-income ratio was from the United States
Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Bulletin.
4) Divorce rate was from the National Center of Health
Statistics, Monthly Vital Statistical Report.
5) Age was from the United States Department of
Commerce Bureau of Census.
CHAPTER V
STATISTICAL ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
This study used regression analysis to analyze the
association of social, economic and the legal environment
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act with personal bankruptcy
before and after the law took effect.
Two equations were used in the estimation. For time
series equation, the data was from 1959-1984. The
unemployment rate, divorce rate and the debt-income ratio
for these years were used. The dummy variable was used for
the exemptions by using zero from 1959-1978 and one from
1979-1984.
The cross-sectional data was taken from fifty states
for 1986. The divorce rate for all fifty states was used.
For unemployment, the unemployment rate was lagged one
year. In order to determine the effect states law on
personal bankruptcy, we used the state homestead exemption.
A state's homestead exemption whose value was less than the
federal exemption took the value of one. Otherwise it took
zero. The percentage of people for each state
population between 25-34 was used for age.
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We expected all variables in the time and cross-
sectional data to be positive and statistically
significant.
In the actual results, all variables had the
theoretically expected sign and most were statistically
significant at 5 percent or better. The F value shows that
the model was appropriately specified.
In the cross-sectional equation all the explanatory
variables are jointly significant to personal bankruptcy.
The unemployment rate, divorce, and exemption are also
significant. But age is not significant because the actual
number was used.
In the time series data, only the debt-income ratio
and exemptions are significant. Unemployment rate is not
significant; this may be due to the fact that unemployment
insurance partially cushions the effect of unemployment on
family incomes. The divorce rate was marginally
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The values in parentheses represent the t-statistics.
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A. Time Series Results
PBRIn = 8.792695 + 0.028932UE + 0.158717DR
(0.156) (1.230)
+ 1.14384DI + 0.732399EL
(1.769) (6.223)
where numbers in parentheses represent t values.
R2 = 0.2737, S.E.E. = .1662, DW = 1.33.
F analysis of variance = 36.33.
The values in parentheses in the equation represents
the t value.
The equation explains 87.37 percent of the time series
variation of personal bankruptcies. The analysis of F
value shows significance of the specification of the
equations. This then proves that the explanatory variables
are jointly significant in explaining the rise in personal
bankruptcy. The explanatory variable does not show
significant correlation between themselves which means that
there is no relationship between the explanatory variable.
The Matrix of Correlation Coefficient is presented in the
Appendices.
At 99 percent confident level, although the
unemployment rate sign was as expected, it did not prove to
be significant to personal bankruptcy rate. Shepard
explained this insignificancy by the fact that unemployment
insurance partially cushioned the financial hardship
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imposed by joblessness for approximately one year. The
coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in the
unemployment rate, increased the amount of personal
bankruptcy by about 289 cases.
The annual divorce rate proved to be slightly
significant to personal bankruptcy. The coefficient matrix
(appendix) shows that the divorce rate are correlated
personal bankruptcy. The estimated coefficient showed that
a one percent increase in divorce rate increased personal
bankruptcy by 1,587 cases.
The debt-income ratio result was significant as
expected. There was a correlation between personal
bankruptcy rate and the debt-income ratio. This shows that
insolvency can lead to personal financial failure. The
estimated coefficient showed that the debt-income ratio
increase the personal bankruptcy rate by 114,348 over the
time period specified.
The variable capturing the final potential determinant
of the rise in personal bankruptcy rate was the exemption.
The estimated coefficient showed that the change in the
exemption, increased personal bankruptcy by 7,323 cases.
The constant showed that if all the explanatory




We used the data from 1986 from fifty states.
SPBRL = 1.73239 + 1.11497UESL + 0.523424DRSL
(3.621) (1.526)
+ 0.213481EL + 0.108222Age
(2.488) (1.152)
R2 = 0.4321, S.E.E. = 0.2714329, DW = 2.134.
The numbers in parentheses in the equation represent the t
value.
Although we had a low R2 with a significant F value,
the explanatory variables are jointly significant.
The cross-sectional result was different from the time
series result in the unemployment rate. Unemployment
rates proved to be highly significant. It was estimated
that a one percentage point change in the unemployment rate
increased personal bankruptcy rate by 11,149.
The effect of divorce rate was also as expected. The
estimate was positive and significant. The coefficient
estimate, indicates that a one percentage change in divorce
rate increased personal bankruptcy by 523,427.
Using a different approach in dumming our exemptions,
the exemption variable seemed to have little effect on
personal bankruptcy. The fact that some states had lowered
their homestead exemptions, the exemption variable was
significant but it was less significant than it was in the
51
time series data. The coefficient estimate suggested that
the exemption helped increase the number of personal
bankruptcy by 2,134.
The age variable was positive but not significant.
The estimate coefficient estimated that a one percentage
change in the age variable increased personal bankruptcy
rate by 1,082.
C. Application of the Results to Georgia
A study was done on three hundred personal bankruptcy
cases in 1985. During this year, Georgia had 16,641
personal bankruptcy cases and the United States had 420,494
cases.
Georgia had a high rate of unemployment of 7.2 percent
and the average disposable income for Georgia in 1985 was
$29,222.
In our study, we observed the occupation of those who
filed the amount of secured and unsecured debt they owe to
different creditors.
Creditors were grouped into three categories: Banks,
non-financial banking institution and others. The
occupation distribution was as follows: white collar, blue
collar, service workers, unemployed, and retired or
disabled.
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The percentage of those who filed matches the
percentage of Georgia's occupational distribution. White
collar workers made up the largest working population.
White collar workers make up 50.9 percent of the working
population and in the study done on personal bankruptcy, 53
percent of the people who filed were white collar workers.
Blue collar workers make up 23 percent of Georgia's
working population, the second largest group. The
percentage of blue collar workers who filed for personal
bankruptcy was 30%.
Service workers made up a small percentage of those in
the working population. They make up 12.6 percent of the
working population and those who filed for personal
bankruptcy made up 11 percent.
The unemployment rate in Georgia in 1985 was 7.2
percent. In our grouping of the occupational distribution,
we kept the unemployed, retired, and disabled into the same
group. This was done because when they were left in
separate groups their percentages were small. Grouping
them together, they made up 6% of those who filed.
With this result, we can say that in Georgia, the
largest occupational distribution of those who file for
personal bankruptcy are white collar workers and the lowest
were the unemployed, disabled and retired.
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The average income of those who filed personal
bankruptcy by the occupational group is summarized in Table
5-2.
In our study on the amount of secured and unsecured
debts, white collar workers had the highest percentage and
amount of debts both for the secured and unsecured debt.
The unemployed, retired and disabled had the lowest. Table
2 summarizes the amount and percentages of debt owed by
each occupational group to each group of creditors.
TABLE 5-2
GEORGIA RESULTS
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND THE MEAN INCOME
OF THOSE OBSERVED
% Occupation
Occupation Group Mean Income
Blue Collar 30% 20,053.14
White Collar 53% 20,659.23
Service Workers n% 22,734.27
Unemployed, disabled 6% 13,384.75
and retired
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TOTAL 6077403.91 100% 1687141.95 100%




Our study shows that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
which was to help people make a "fresh start" after a
financial failure is a major cause of the increase in
personal bankruptcy rate.
Econometrics results confirm that debt-income ratio,
exemption and divorce rate are also major contributing
factors to personal bankruptcy. Although unemployment rate
and age was not statistically significant, they are also
contributing factors to personal bankruptcy.
The study on personal bankruptcy in Georgia shows that
more white collar workers in Georgia file for personal
bankruptcy than any other occupation and that creditors are
losing a considerable amount of money from their customers
who file for personal bankruptcy. These losses should be a
major concern to lawmakers and creditors because as the
personal bankruptcy rate continues to increase, these
losses could hurt the nation's economy.
Even though there has been an amendment in the
exemptions in 1984, there should be a stricter amendment in
the homestead exemption of the law.
APPENDIX A





Personal Unemploy- Divorce Income Exemp-



















Personal Unemploy- Divorce Exemp-

























Alden, F. Shiers, and Daniel P. Williamson. "Nonbusiness
Bankruptcies and the Law: Some Empirical Result."
Journal of Consumer Affairsf Vol. 21, No. 2, 1987:
417-432.
Brummer, Andrew F. "Public Policy and the Economic
Implications on Personal Bankruptcies." Statement
before the Subcommittee on Court Senate Judiciary
Community, April 3, 1981.
Carter, Charlie. "The Surge in Bankruptcies is the Law
Responsible?" Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta (January 1982) .
Harris, Duane. "Prosperity and Personal Bankruptcies."
Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
(1971): 3-9.
Hecks, Ramona K. A. "An Econometric Analysis of Interstate
Differences in Non-business Bankruptcy and Chapter
Thirteen Rates." Journal of Consumer Affairs. Vol. 15,
1981: 13-31.
Kowalewski, K. J. "Personal Bankruptcies Theory and
Evidence." Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland (Spring 1982): 1-30.
Peterson, Richard L., and Kiyomi Aoki. "Personal Filing
Before and After Implementation of the Bankruptcy
Reform Law." Journal of Economics and Business,. Vol.
36 (1984): 188-208.
Shepard, Lawrence. "Accounting for the Rise in Consumer
Bankruptcy Rate in the United States: A Preliminary
Analysis of Aggregate Data (1945-1981)." Journal of
Consumer Affairs 18 (1984a): 213-230.
Shepard, Lawrence. "Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy




Sommer, Henry. "Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Practice."
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.
Survey of Current Business. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, selected monthly issue.
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the U.S. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, selected annual issues.
U. S. Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Annual
Report. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
selected annual issues.
Collier on Bankruptcy state Exemption #15.
Public Library of Congress (1986) .
Yeager, Frederick C. "Personal Bankruptcy and Economic
Stability." Southern Economic Journal 41 (1974): 96-
